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PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE: A COMMON
LAW ROADMAP FOR STATE COURTS
Alan Meisel*
Introduction
Public debate about physician-assisted suicide' has been raging
for a decade. Although the exploits of Jack Kevorkian have proba-
bly been the best known factor in making this issue a matter of
widespread public discussion, the groundwork had begun to be laid
a few years earlier by an article in the Journal of the American
Medical Association in which a physician anonymously (and per-
haps fictitiously) claimed to have acceded to a patient's request to
end her life by means of a lethal overdose.2 This debate probably
would have continued without Dr. Kevorkian's activities, or the
publicity surrounding them, because of the publication of a self-
help guide to suicide, Final Exit,3 and an article in the New Eng-
land Journal of Medicine by Dr. Timothy Quill in which he de-
scribed having provided a terminally ill patient with a lethal
* Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote Professor of Bioethics and Professor of Law,
University of Pittsburgh. I am grateful to Professor Barry McCarthy for his helpful
suggestions, and to Melissa J. Hancock and Jan 0. Wentzel for their research
assistance.
1. Like it or not, the terms "assisted suicide" and "physician-assisted suicide" are
probably here to stay. The problem with this terminology is that it prejudges the
conclusion and it makes the practice illicit because of the long-standing pejorative
connotations associated with the word "suicide." Traditionally the term "suicide" has
been used to apply to self-killing by a physically healthy person for some purpose
other than ending the pain and/or suffering arising from terminal illness. It is prefera-
ble in the context of a person with terminal illness who seeks to end his pain and/or
suffering by ending his life, with the assistance of another, as "actively hastening
death."
Aid-in-dying can take two forms. This phrase encompasses both actively and pas-
sively hastening death. Passively hastening death consists of withholding or with-
drawing life-sustaining medical treatment. See infra notes 30-32 and the
accompanying text. Actively hastening death includes two distinct practices, assisted
suicide and active euthanasia (or mercy killing). When assisted suicide is practiced, a
person provides a terminally ill patient with a means for that patient to end his own
life, which is administered by the patient. When active euthanasia is practiced, the
other person not only provides, but also administers the instrumentality of death.
2. A Piece of My Mind; It's Over, Debbie, 259 JAMA 272 (1988).
3. DEREK HUMPHRY, FINAL ExIT (1991).
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overdose of medication which she self-administered. 4 The crown-
ing events in this debate were the decisions by two federal courts of
appeal holding unconstitutional the New York and Washington
state statutes making assisted suicide a crime, and the United
States Supreme Court's subsequent reversals.5
The reaction to these developments by opponents of actively
hastening death have consisted of a variety of apocalyptic predic-
tions about how the legalization of physician-assisted suicide will
make the United States resemble Nazi Germany. The opposition
to the legalization of physician-assisted suicide is deep and broad,
but, ironically, the support for legalization is too. A variety of pub-
lic opinion polls report that support for physician-assisted suicide
hovers around the seventy-five percent mark.6 Some polls of phy-
4. Timothy E. Quill, A Case of Individualized Decision Making, 324 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 691 (1991).
5. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd sub
nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997); Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716
(2d Cir. 1996), rev'd,117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
6. Since 1947, the National Opinion Research Center has asked the question,
"When a person has a disease that cannot be cured, do you think doctors should be
allowed by law to end a patient's life by some painless means if the patient and his
family request it?" The affirmative answers to this question have consistently risen,
from 37 percent in 1947 to 75 percent in 1996. However, the phrasing of this question
could reasonably include passively hastening death as well as actively hastening death.
Other nationwide polls since 1993 that actually refer to legalizing assisted suicide or
approving the practices of Dr. Kevorkian show a gradually increasing trend, in which
support for physician-assisted suicide has risen from the low to mid 40 percent range
to the mid to high 50 percent range. See Louis Harris & Assoc., Survey Conducted
Dec. 9-14, 1994, Q. 002, available in WESTLAW, Poll Database (indicating 58 percent
of the respondents approve of Kevorkian's actions); Louis Harris & Assoc., Survey
Conducted Nov. 11-15, 1993, Q. 002, available in WESTLAW, Poll Database (indicat-
ing 58 percent of the respondents approve of Kevorkian's actions); Hart & Teeter
Res. Co., Survey Conducted June 20-25, 1996, Q. 024, available in WESTLAW, Poll
Database 0 (indicating 57 percent of the respondents support the legalization of phy-
sician-assisted suicide); Gallup Org., Survey Conducted Jan. 20 - Feb. 13, 1994, Q. 041,
available in WESTLAW, Poll Database (indicating 57 percent of the respondents sup-
port the legalizing physician-assisted suicide under specific circumstances); Gallup
Org., Survey Conducted Jan. 20 - Feb. 13, 1994, Q. 042, available in WESTLAW, Poll
Database (indicating 55 percent of the respondents support legalizing euthanasia
under specific circumstances); Tarrance group et al., Survey Conducted Dec. 8-10,
1993, Q. 002, available in WESTLAW, Poll Database (indicating 54 percent of the
respondents support physician-assisted suicide); CBS News, Survey Conducted Dec.
5-7, 1993, Q. 001, available in WESTLAW, Poll Database (indicating 52 percent of the
respondents approve of Kevorkian's actions); Wash. Post, Survey Conducted Mar. 22-
26, 1996, Q. 002, available in WESTLAW, Poll Database (indicating 51 percent of the
respondents support legalizing physician-assisted suicide); Louis Harris & Assoc.,
Survey Conducted Mar. 4-10, 1993, Q. 002, available in WESTLAW, Poll Database
(indicating 50 percent of the respondents approve of Kevorkian's actions); Gallup
Org., Survey Conducted Dec. 4-6, 1993, Q. 009, available in WESTLAW, Poll
Database (indicating 47 percent of the respondents generally approve of physicians'
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sicians also find significant support for the legalization of physi-
cian-assisted suicide.7 However, because behavior deviates from
the expression of opinion, the level of support diminished signifi-
cantly when voters in three states were presented with the opportu-
nity to legalize physician-assisted suicide. Two of these referenda
were defeated by fifty-six percent to forty-four percent margins
8
before the Oregon Death with Dignity Act was approved by
slightly more than fifty percent of the voters in 1994. 9
Although the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of
state prohibitions on physician-assisted suicide, efforts to legalize
physician-assisted suicide on state-law grounds are likely to con-
tinue. One way to legalize such action would be the enactment of
referenda like Oregon's 10 in other states. This may occur in a few
states, but will be unlikely in most because the process of placing a
question on a statewide ballot is extremely cumbersome. State leg-
islatures could also revise existing legislation prohibiting assisted
suicide by creating an exception, hedged with safeguards like the
Oregon statute's, for physician-assisted suicide for the terminally
ill. This too seems unlikely to occur to any great extent. Physician-
assisted suicide, like abortion, is just too controversial a subject for
assisting in suicides of patients in great pain); CBS News, Survey Conducted Dec. 13-
14, 1993, Q. 001, available in WESTLAW, Poll Database (indicating 46 percent of the
respondents approve of Kevorkian's actions); Gallup Org., Survey Conducted Dec. 4-
6, 1993, Q. 045, available in WESTLAW, Poll Database (indicating 43 percent of the
respondents approve of Kevorkian's actions).
7. See, e.g., Melinda A. Lee et al., Legalizing Assisted Suicide-Views of Physi-
cians in Oregon, 334 NEW ENG. J. MED. 310, 311 (1996) (reporting that 60 percent of
responding Oregon physicians supported legalization of physician-assisted suicide);
Jerald G. Bachman et al., Attitudes of Michigan Physicians and the Public Toward
Legalizing Physician-Assisted Suicide and Voluntary Euthanasia, 334 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 303, 305 (1996) (reporting that only 17.2 percent of responding Michigan physi-
cians favored legal prohibition of assisted-suicide).
8. See Diane M. Gianelli, Euthanasia Measure Fails, But Backers Vow Renewed
Push, AM. MED. NEWS, Nov. 23-30, 1992, at 30 (describing California proposal to
legalize euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide); Jane Gross, Voters Turn Down
Mercy Killing Idea, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1991, at A10 (nat'l ed.) (reporting on Wash-
ington state initiative to legalize administration of lethal injections by physicians to
"adult patients who are in a medically terminal condition" at the patients' request).
There was also a failed attempt to get an initiative to legalize physician-assisted sui-
cide for the terminally ill on the ballot in California in 1988. See Katherine Bishop,
Backers Fail to Get Lethal Injection Bid on California Ballot, N.Y. TIMES, May 18,
1988, at A23.
9. Oregon Death with Dignity Act, OR. REV. STAT. § 13 (1996), implementation
stayed, Lee v. State, 891 F. Supp. 1439 (D. Or. 1995), rev'd, 107 F.3d 1382 (9th
Cir.),cert. denied sub nom. Lee v. Harcleroad, 118 S. Ct. 328 (1997).
10. See id.
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legislatures to vote to approve regardless of individual legislators'
views on the subject.
Now that the Supreme Court effectively precludes access to fed-
eral constitutional arguments for the legalization of physician-as-
sisted suicide, the most likely avenue for legalization will be state
constitutional" and common-law claims. Many of the arguments
accepted by the two federal courts of appeals that struck down the
New York and Washington state statutes12 can be revived in this
litigation. Because these contentions have been subjected to inor-
dinate scrutiny and critique in law review articles, the multitude of
briefs filed in the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court's opin-
ions themselves, there is no need to dwell on them here.
Despite the Supreme Court's decisions, neither the controversy
nor the practice will go away.13 The proper course is not to con-
tinue to prohibit physician-assisted suicide, but to legalize it and
regulate it. Without legalization, it cannot be regulated. History
and common sense show that continued legal prohibition will not
in fact prevent actively hastening death. Indeed, the widespread
public discussions of physician-assisted suicide might embolden
physicians who otherwise would not have practiced it to consider
doing so, and encourage physicians who practiced it infrequently
and covertly to do so more frequently and openly.
This article returns to the legal basics. The efforts to legalize
physician-assisted suicide slowly evolved out of twenty years of ju-
dicial and legislative efforts legalizing passively hastening death.
Part I examines the development of the law legalizing passively
hastening death and how this development relied significantly on
distinguishing passively hastening death from actively hastening
death.'4 Part II subjects the arguments used to legitimate passively
hastening death to a traditional criminal law analysis and demon-
11. This process has already begun in Florida. A trial court ruled that the state's
ban on assisted suicide was unconstitutional, Mclver v. Krischer, 679 So. 2d 786 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1996), but the Florida Supreme Court reversed. Krischer v. Mclver,
697 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1997).
12. See supra note 5.
13. Although this article is written supporting the legalization of actively hasten-
ing death, there is no doubt that there are dangers to its legalization: dangers that the
safeguards will be ignored; dangers that strict safeguards will erode, either in practice
or through judicial decision, and people will kill themselves for all sorts of trivial rea-
sons; dangers that life will be devalued; dangers that we will gradually convert a prac-
tice by the few under rare circumstances at their request into one frequently invoked
against many. In short, dangers of the proverbial slippery slope.
14. Actively hastening death includes, but is not limited to, physician-assisted
suicide.
820
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strates their weaknesses which were simple to conceal when there
was little enthusiasm for, and discussion of, the legalization of ac-
tively hastening death.
The central role of consent in legitimating passively hastening
death is analyzed in Part III. Although passively hastening death
technically satisfies all of the elements of the crimes of assisted sui-
cide and homicide, it is not illegal because it is legitimated by con-
sent - consent of a competent patient or consent of the surrogate
of an incompetent patient. Consent is the mechanism for imple-
menting the fundamental principle of self-determination on which
the entire edifice of the law of medical decision-making at the end
of life (indeed, the law of medical decision-making in general) is
built.
This analysis is applied to actively hastening death in Part IV.
Because there is no legally significant distinction between actively
and passively hastening death, consent legitimates actively hasten-
ing death just as it does passively hastening death. Nonetheless,
Part V explores other reasons why actively hastening death ought
to be prohibited and concludes that any arguments of any sub-
stance that can be made against actively hastening death can be
equally applied to passively hastening death and should, therefore,
be rejected in the latter as they are in the former. Safeguards must
be established to prevent abuse of actively hastening death just as
they have for passively hastening death.
I. The Consensus about Forgoing Life-sustaining Treatment and
the Bright Line Between Actively and Passively
Hastening Death
Hastening the death of a dying person is not a new phenomenon.
Historical accounts are widespread and are not limited to ancient
stories about the practices of our barbarian forebears. There is
plenty of evidence that aid-in-dying has been practiced continually
1997]
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throughout modern history by physicians 15 and nonphysicians
alike. 6
Some forms of physician aid-in-dying have been accepted in
American law for the past two decades. The celebrated In re Quin-
lan 7 case, decided in 1976, marked the first step in the legalization
of physician aid-in-dying. Quinlan has more than 100 progeny in
half the states, 18 and has spawned a variety of legislative enact-
ments19 that recognize the legal right to "passively" hasten death.
Passively hastening death includes refusal of treatment, termina-
tion of life support, forgoing treatment, or withholding and with-
drawing treatment, and variants on these terms.
This agglomeration of case and statutory law comprises a well-
accepted legal consensus from which it is reasonable to infer how
the case law on passively hastening death will develop in the states
15. See, e.g., Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Euthanasia-Historical, Ethical, and Empiric
Perspectives, 154 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1890 (1994); see also Compassion in Dy-
ing v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 828 (9th Cir. 1996) ("[D]octors have been discreetly
helping terminally ill patients hasten their deaths for decades and probably centuries,
while acknowledging privately that there was no other medical purpose to their ac-
tions. They have done so with the tacit approval of a substantial percentage of both
the public and the medical profession."), rev'd sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg,
117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
16. See, e.g., Leonard H. Glantz, Withholding and Withdrawing Treatment: The
Role of the Criminal Law, 15 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 231 (1987).
17. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922
(1976).
18. See 1 ALAN MEISEL, THE RIGHT TO DIE § 1.7 (2d ed. 1995 & Supp. 1997)
[hereinafter 1 MEISEL].
19. There are several types of such statutes. The most widespread and best known
are advance directive statutes creating a mechanism for competent individuals to
make medical decisions after they lose decision-making capacity either by giving di-
rections about what treatment they do or do not want (living will statutes) or
designating someone to make decisions for them (health care power of attorney stat-
utes). See generally 2 id., chs. 10-12. Surrogate decision-making (or family decision-
making) statutes authorize particular individuals to make health care decisions for
patients who lack decision-making capacity and have not appointed a proxy through a
health care power of attorney. See id. ch. 14. Do-not-resuscitate statutes either au-
thorize physicians to write orders not to withhold cardiopulmonary resuscitation from
a patient who suffers a cardiac arrest or authorize patients to execute a request for
cardiopulmonary resuscitation to be withheld. See id. §§ 9.7 - 9.30. A small number
of states have enacted statutes authorizing physicians to provide patients with ade-
quate medication for pain relief. See id. § 8.7 (Supp. 1997) (Table 8-1) (collecting
statutes). From a purely legal perspective, these statutes are largely superfluous be-
cause they implement rights that have their foundations in constitutional or common-
law principles. However, as a practical matter, their restatement in positive law may
assist in alleviating physicians' anxieties about the existence of these rights and thus
may make them more willing to effectuate them.
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that have not yet had an authoritative appellate case. 20 This con-
sensus rests on three fundamental points: (1) there is a legal right
of autonomy or self-determination which vests in competent indi-
viduals the right to refuse medical treatment, even if death results;
(2) persons who have lost decision-making capacity have a right to
have their families decide to withhold or withdraw medical treat-
ment, even if death results;21 and (3) there is a bright line between
the refusal of treatment that results in death and more "active"
means of hastening death.
Quinlan, and the consensus that has evolved from it, acknowl-
edge a clear awareness of the distinction between passively and ac-
tively hastening death. Courts and legislatures are mindful of this
distinction and have taken special pains to distinguish the two
forms of hastening death. In fact, it is fair to say that this distinc-
tion has been the bedrock of the consensus. Without this distinc-
tion, it is doubtful that Quinlan would have been decided as it was
or that the legal consensus about forgoing life-sustaining treatment
would have evolved.
Opponents of the legalization of physician-assisted suicide object
that Quinlan and its progeny are different because the current
movement is for the legalization of actively hastening death.22 Re-
gardless of terminology, the common feature is that life-sustaining
medical treatment is either stopped or not started. In actuality,
20. I have discussed this consensus at some length in 1 MEISEL, supra note 18,
§§ 2.2 - 2.5, at 38-54, and in Alan Meisel, The Legal Consensus about Forgoing Life-
Sustaining Treatment: Its Status and Its Prospects, 2 KENNEDY INSTITUTE ETHICS J.
309 (1992).
21. It is generally recognized that close family members of patients who lack deci-
sion-making capacity have the common-law authority to act as surrogate for the pa-
tient and to make decisions about life-sustaining medical treatment on the basis of the
substituted judgment standard. However, a small number of states reject this princi-
ple. New York does in all situations. See In re Westchester County Medical Ctr. ex rel
O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d 607 (N.Y. 1988). Missouri does, at least with respect to feeding
tubes. See Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988), affd sub nom. Cruzan v.
Director, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); but cf. In re Warren, 858 S.W.2d 263 (Mo. Ct. App.
1993) (holding of Cruzan applicable only to decisions to forgo artificial nutrition and
hydration). Michigan rejects it if the patient is not terminally ill or permanently un-
conscious. See Martin v. Martin, 538 N.W.2d 399 (Mich. 1995). Maine rejects substi-
tuted judgment by name, see In re Swan, 569 A.2d 1202 (Me. 1990), but appears to
apply it in fact. See 1 MEISEL, supra note 18, § 7.5, at 364-66.
22. See supra note 9. The current debate focuses on, and the two Supreme Court
cases deal exclusively with, physician-assisted suicide. Even if one believes that there
is no morally or legally significant difference between assisted suicide and active eu-
thanasia, there are reasons why one might support physician-assisted suicide but not
active euthanasia by doctors. For example, because the agency of death must be ad-
ministered by the patient in physician-assisted suicide, there is a greater assurance
that the patient is mentally competent.
19971 823
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there never was a bright legal, logical or moral line between the
two; the distinction was never more than semantic.
Only a few judges have been willing to acknowledge this, the
best known of whom is Justice Scalia. In Cruzan v. Director,3 he
devoted a substantial part of his concurring opinion to arguing that
there was no constitutional right to passively hasten death because
it was the equivalent of killing and the states had the constitutional
authority to prohibit such conduct if they so chose. Many illustra-
tions could be plucked from his opinion, but one should suffice:
Starving oneself to death [his characterization of forgoing artifi-
cial nutrition and hydration procedures] is no different from put-
ting a gun to one's temple as far as the common-law definition
of suicide is concerned; the cause of death in both cases is the
suicide's conscious decision to "pu[t] an end to his own
existence."24
Yet, for two decades courts created and maintained the fiction,
with little, if any, in-depth analysis, that there is a difference, a
determinative difference, between passively and actively hastening
death.
Doing this has served primarily a practical political purpose:
making passively hastening death acceptable to courts, to legisla-
tures, to the medical profession and to the public. If the withhold-
ing or withdrawal of life-sustaining medical treatment were to be
viewed as "killing" a patient, it would have been far more difficult,
and probably impossible, for the practice of passively hastening
death ever to have achieved legitimacy. As proponents embarked
23. Cruzan v. Director, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
24. Id. at 296-97, quoting 4 Blackstone, Commentaries *189. See also Mack v.
Mack, 618 A.2d 744, 774 (Md. 1993) (Chasanow, J., concurring and dissenting) ("I do
not, however, subscribe to the passive euthanasia implication" of the majority opin-
ion.); Brophy v. New Eng. Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 640 (Mass. 1986) (Nolan,
J., dissenting) ("court today has indorsed euthanasia"); id. at 644-45 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting); In re Grant, 747 P.2d 445, 458 (Wash. 1987) (forgoing artificial nutrition
and hydration "is pure, unadorned euthanasia") (Andersen, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
25. Even the Supreme Court's discussion in Vacco of the purported differences
between actively and passively hastening death is superficial. In the end, the Court is
content to conclude:
Granted, in some cases, the line between the two may not be clear, but cer-
tainty is not required, even were it possible. Logic and contemporary prac-
tice support New York's judgment that the two acts are different, and New
York may therefore, consistent with the Constitution, treat them differently.
By permitting everyone to refuse unwanted medical treatment while prohib-
iting anyone from assisting a suicide, New York law follows a longstanding
and rational distinction.
Vacco, 117 S. Ct. at 2302.
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on the legitimation of passively hastening death, courts recognized
that making and emphasizing the distinction between passively and
actively hastening death met a symbolic, and perhaps real, need to
preserve the fundamental societal prohibition of killing innocent
human beings.
Synonyms for actively hastening death, such as suicide, assisted
suicide, active euthanasia, and mercy killing, have deeply negative
connotations. They would have been like Typhoid Mary to the de-
velopment of the law of end-of-life decision-making. No one
wanted to associate with these terms for fear of becoming tainted.
Thus, courts that wanted to recognize a right of both competent
and incompetent individuals to be free of unwanted medical treat-
ment realistically appraised the situation and determined that the
best way to establish this right was to conceptualize, compartmen-
talize, and package the "right to die" to make it more acceptable.
The most fundamental way in which courts did this was to proclaim
not merely a significant difference, but a legally determinative dif-
ference between actively and passively hastening death, even if
such a difference did not exist. This was accomplished by conclud-
ing that passively hastening death does not meet the requirements
of the criminal offenses of homicide or assisted suicide, but actively
hastening death does.
II. Purported Distinctions between Passively and Actively
Hastening Death
The primary motivation for seeking judicial review in end-of-life
decision-making cases is the fear of liability arising from forgoing
life-sustaining treatment.26 Although the opinions of the appellate
courts allude to the fear of both civil and criminal liability, the ma-
jor concern has been with criminal liability. It has been asserted
that forgoing life-sustaining treatment would constitute some form
of criminal homicide 27 in the case of patients lacking decision-mak-
ing capacity, and aiding, assisting, or abetting suicide2 8 in the case
26. See 2 MEISEL, THE RIGHT TO DIE § 17.24, at 431 n.445 (2d ed. 1995) (collect-
ing cases) [hereinafter 2 MEISEL].
27. See, e.g., Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 487 (Ct. App. 1983);
Rosebush v. Oakland County Prosecutor, 491 N.W.2d 633, 641 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992);
In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 669 (N.J. 1976); Eichner v. Dillon, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 377,
420 N.E.2d 64, 71, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 273 (1981); Grace Plaza of Great Neck, Inc. v.
Elbaum, 82 N.Y.2d 10, 29, 623 N.E.2d 513, 517, 603 N.Y.S.2d 386, 390 (1993) (Han-
cock, J., concurring); In re Colyer, 660 P.2d 738, 751 (Wash. 1983).
28. See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674 (Ariz. 1987); Bouvia v. Superior
Court (Glenchur), 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Ct. App. 1986); Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d
1997]
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of competent patients. The possibility of liability for conspiracy or
accessory liability has also lurked in the background of the cases.
Beginning with Quinlan,29 the courts have steadfastly hewed to
the position that forgoing life-sustaining treatment does not subject
the participants-either those who make the decision or those who
actually withhold or withdraw the treatment-to criminal liability.
In so doing, judges have not merely legitimated the forgoing of life-
sustaining treatment, they have also endeavored to distinguish pas-
sively hastening death from actively hastening death, and to con-
demn the latter.
The courts have achieved this dual effort by employing three
30stratagems, sometimes alone and sometimes in combination. The
fundamental idea is that passively hastening death is not a crime
because (1) death results from an omission rather than an act, (2)
the intent necessary to support a crime is lacking, and/or (3) the
omission is not the cause of the patient's death. Each of these
stratagems, in effect, negates an essential element of a crime: act,
intent, or causation. In addition, a small number of courts have
taken a fourth tack and concluded that there is no criminal liability
because the patient has a legal right to refuse treatment.31
A. Act and Omission
1. The Traditional Explanation
The first method of avoiding criminal liability when life-sus-
taining medical treatment is forgone begins with the assertion that
forgoing treatment is an omission, not an act. The locution some-
times used is that when treatment is forgone, the patient is allowed
to die; no one is killing him.32 In the case of a competent patient, it
160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404 (N.J. 1987); In re Quinlan,
355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976); In re Eichner, 102 Misc.2d 184, 423 N.Y.S.2d 580 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County 1979).
29. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
30. The Supreme Court used these same stratagems in Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct.
2293 (1997), to explain why there is a rational distinction between New York's statu-
tory ban on assisted suicide and its case law permitting the forgoing of life-sustaining
treatment.
31. See, e.g., Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 277 n.6.
32. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1224 (N.J. 1985). See generally PRESI-
DENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE & BIOMEDI-
CAL & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING
TREATMENT 64-66 (1983) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, DECIDING TO FOREGO
LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT]. The Supreme Court took this position in Vacco v.
Quill:
This Court has also recognized, at least implicitly, the distinction between
letting a patient die and making that patient die. In Cruzan v. Director, Mo.
826
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is maintained that the patient is not committing suicide but merely
omitting treatment.33 These arguments are founded on the as-
sumption that acts are culpable but omissions are not. Thus, pas-
sively hastening death by forgoing life-sustaining treatment is not
culpable, but actively hastening death is.
2. Difficulties with the Traditional Explanation
There are at least three problems with this approach, any one of
which is fatal.
a. Liability for Omissions
The most general flaw with the traditional explanation is that
this assertion about the nature of criminal liability is flat-out
wrong; liability may be imposed for an omission.34 Although it is
well accepted black-letter law, both in criminal law 35 and the civil
law of torts,36 that an omission to act is not culpable, this is merely
a general rule or presumption that can be overcome by showing
that the party who omitted to act was under a duty to do so.
Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2851, 111 L. Ed. 2d 224
(1990), we concluded that "[t]he principle that a competent person has a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical
treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions," and we assumed the
existence of such a right for purposes of that case, id. at 279, 110 S. Ct. at
2851-2852. But our assumption of a right to refuse treatment was grounded
not, as the Court of Appeals supposed, on the proposition that patients have
a general and abstract "right to hasten death," 80 F.3d at 727-728, but on
well established, traditional rights to bodily integrity and freedom from un-
wanted touching, Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278-279, 110 S. Ct. at 2851-52; id. 287-
288, 110 S. Ct. at 2856-2857 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In fact, we observed
that "the majority of States in this country have laws imposing criminal pen-
alties on one who assists another to commit suicide." Id. at 280, 110 S. Ct. at
2852. Cruzan therefore provides no support for the notion that refusing life-
sustaining medical treatment is "nothing more nor less than suicide."
Vacco, 117 S. Ct. at 2301.
33. See, e.g., Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 162-63 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
34. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 822 (9th Cir. 1996)
("The first distinction - the line between commission and omission - is a distinction
without a difference now that patients are permitted not only to decline all medical
treatment, but to instruct their doctors to terminate whatever treatment, artificial or
otherwise, they are receiving."), rev'd sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct.
2258 (1997). See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. ScoTr, JR., SUBSTAN-
TIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 3.3, at 202-03 (2d ed. 1986).
35. See id. § 3.3, at 203-07. See generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 commentary
at 222-24 (1985).
36. See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS § 56, at 375 (5th ed. 1984).
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There are various ways to show an individual had a duty to act.
In the context of life-sustaining medical treatment, one can look
for a duty established by contract or by the actor's voluntarily un-
dertaking to act on behalf of the victim. In the present context, the
two are essentially indistinguishable: the doctor-patient relation-
ship is generally agreed to be contractual in nature; and although
as a general rule a physician has no obligation to treat a patient, 7
once there is an agreement to do so, a duty arises to continue to
provide treatment until the relationship is terminated in any one of
a number of legally acceptable ways. 8
This does not mean that the physician is legally obligated to treat
the patient until the patient dies despite the physician's efforts. In
end-of-life decision-making cases, a physician is excused from the
obligation to provide treatment either by the patient's consent for
the physician to forgo treatment or, if the patient lacks decision-
making capacity, by the permission of a person legally authorized
to act on the patient's behalf.
b. Forgoing Treatment May Be Accomplished by an Act
The second problem with the argument that forgoing life-sus-
taining treatment is not criminally culpable because it is an omis-
sion rather than an act is that sometimes "forgoing" treatment is
accomplished by an act, not by an omission. There are two ways in
which treatment may be forgone. "Withholding" treatment is
readily and uncontroversially denominated an omission. The one
almost universally involved in the reported cases, however, is
"withdrawing" treatment.39
37. This general rule is undergoing a slow process of erosion. See, e.g., Emergency
Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b) (1994) (requiring
hospitals to evaluate and stabilize an emergency condition before transferring a pa-
tient to another hospital); 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(1)(B) (1994) (subjecting physicians
who negligently violate EMTALA to potential civil monetary penalties). But see, e.g.,
Vickers v. Nash Gen. Hosp., Inc., 875 F. Supp. 313, 315 (E.D.N.C. 1995), affd, 78 F.3d
139 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that EMTALA does not create a private right of action
against violating physicians, as it does against hospitals). See also Sharrow v. Bailey,
910 F. Supp. 187, 192 (M.D. Pa. 1995) (holding that a physician's professional office
was a place of "public accommodation" for purposes of the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act); Woolfolk v. Duncan, 872 F. Supp. 1381, 1391 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
38. Controversy also rages over termination of the doctor-patient relationship in
end-of-life cases when the doctor seeks to terminate the relationship - or, more spe-
cifically, the treatment - against the wishes of the patient's family. This issue is gen-
erally discussed under the label of "futility." See generally 2 MEISEL supra note 26, at
ch. 19.
39. The reason that litigated cases almost exclusively involve withdrawing, rather
than withholding, is because it is so much easier to disavow psychological responsibil-
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Withdrawing treatment ordinarily requires the physician, or
someone under the physician's authority and acting at the physi-
cian's direction, to do something to stop treatment, such as remov-
ing ventilatory support or a feeding tube. That being the case,
someone performs an act which leads to the patient's death. 0
c. Difficulty in Distinguishing Between Act and Omission
A third problem with the traditional explanation is the difficulty
in characterizing behavior as either an act or an omission. The
New Jersey Supreme Court addressed this problem in In re
Conroy:nl
Characterizing conduct as active or passive is often an elusive
notion, even outside the context of medical decision-making.
Saint Anselm of Canterbury was fond of citing the tricki-
ness of the distinction between "to do" (facere) and "not to do"
(non facere). In answer to the question "What's he doing?" we
ity for forgoing treatment by not initiating a treatment than by stopping a treatment
that is already in progress. Cases of withholding are less likely to reach a physician's
discomfort level, and, thus, to elicit a refusal to forgo treatment which then forces the
patient's family to seek judicial permission to overturn that refusal. In addition, with-
holding less clearly presents a decision point than withdrawing.
40. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 822 (9th Cir. 1996) ("In
disconnecting a respirator, or authorizing its disconnection, a doctor is unquestionably
committing an act; he is taking an active role in bringing about the patient's death. In
fact, there can be no doubt that in such instances the doctor intends that, as the result
of his action, the patient will die an earlier death than he otherwise would."), rev'd
sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997). See also PRESIDENT'S
COMM'N, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra note 32, at 73-
74 (physicians have great difficulty stopping treatment than not starting because with-
drawing treatment already in progress "seems to them to constitute killing the patient.
By contrast, not starting a therapy seems acceptable, supposedly because it involves
an omission rather than an action."). Indeed, it is arguable that physician-assisted
suicide is more passive than withdrawing treatment. As contemplated by the only
statute to legalize physician-assisted suicide, the Oregon Death with Dignity Act,
supra note 9, the physician's conduct would be to write a prescription. On an active-
passive scale, this is arguably more passive than the more common form of "with-
drawing" treatment, namely removing a patient from a ventilator. See Quill v. Vacco,
80 F.3d 716, 729 (2d Cir. 1996) ("Moreover, the writing of a prescription to hasten
death, after consultation with a patient, involves a far less active role for the physician
than is required in bringing about death through asphyxiation, starvation and/or dehy-
dration. Withdrawal of life support requires physicians or those acting at their direc-
tion physically to remove equipment and, often, to administer palliative drugs which
may themselves contribute to death. The ending of life by these means is nothing
more nor less than assisted suicide. It simply cannot be said that those mentally com-
petent, terminally-ill persons who seek to hasten death but whose treatment does not
include life support are treated equally.").
41. 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985).
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say "He's just sitting there" (positive), really meaning something
negative: "He's not doing anything at all."...
The distinction is particularly nebulous, however, in the con-
text of decisions whether to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining
treatment.
42
That the very same treatment can be forgone either by withholding
(omitting to act) or by withdrawing (acting) strongly suggests that
the legal consequences should not depend on such slim semantic
differences having no practical difference between them.
Take the case of a patient who is being kept alive by a feeding
tube, as has so often been the situation in litigated cases.43 When a
decision is made to forgo tube-feeding, there are two general ways
to accomplish it: one is to take the feeding tube out; the other is to
leave it in place but not introduce any further fluids or nourish-
ment through the tube.4 Is death achieved by an act or by an
omission? More fundamentally, should legal culpability turn on
such hair-splitting distinctions that have no practical differences? 45
Thus, as the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded, "'merely deter-
mining whether what was done involved a fatal act or omission
does not establish whether it was morally acceptable .... [In fact,
a]ctive steps to terminate life-sustaining interventions may be per-
mitted, indeed required, by the patient's authority to forgo therapy
even when such steps lead to death.' ' '46
Similar scenarios can be sketched for other common forms of life
support. A ventilator could be turned off and the tube removed
from the patient. This seems to be an act, and, thus, would be le-
gally culpable as long as the other elements of a crime could be
proved. Instead, the patient could be left on the ventilator and the
42. Id. at 1234 (citations omitted); see also PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, DECIDING TO
FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra note 32, at 74.
43. See 1 MEISEL, supra note 18, § 9.39, at 607-08 (Table 9-2) (collecting cases).
44. There are possible logical variations on this though they may not be clinically
feasible. For example, one could decide not to introduce additional fluid or nourish-
ment when the current supply runs out, or one could decide to leave the feeding tube
in place but cut off the supply of fluids and/or nourishment rather than waiting for the
current supply to be depleted.
45. "In a case like that of Claire Conroy, for example, would a physician who
discontinued nasogastric feeding be actively causing her death by removing her pri-
mary source of nutrients; or would he merely be omitting to continue the artificial
form of treatment, thus passively allowing her medical condition, which includes her
inability to swallow, to take its natural course?" Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1234, citing
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra
note 32, at 65-66.
46. Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1234, (quoting PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, DECIDING TO
FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra note 32, at 67, 72).
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gases not properly adjusted or replenished when they run out.
Death, by this latter course, would result from an omission, and it
would not be culpable.
Consider a patient being kept alive by antibiotics administered
through an intravenous drip. Does the patient's death result from
an act or an omission if the drip is not replenished when the cur-
rent bag of solution containing the antibiotics is finished? It ap-
pears to be an omission which is not culpable, but the physician or
nurse who turns off the drip before it is fully depleted commits an
act which is legally blameworthy. Ceteribus paribus, should the
"stopping" of one be legally blameworthy but the "not starting" of
the other be legally nonculpable?47
The question of whether there is a legally determinative distinc-
tion between withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining medical
treatment has arisen countless times since the Quinlan case. 8 The
courts have uniformly concluded that it makes no difference
whether life-sustaining medical treatment is forgone by withhold-
ing or by withdrawing treatment. Both are legally permissible
forms of forgoing life-sustaining medical treatment. That one in-
volves an act and the other involves an omission is deemed to be of
no legal significance.4 9
While this precludes liability for passively hastening death by the
withdrawal of treatment, it creates another problem. By equating
withdrawing with withholding, withdrawal attains the same legal
status as omissions. But the reason why some acts (those involved
in passively hastening death) are still considered omissions while
others (those involved in actively hastening death) are not is never
47. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREAT-
MENT, supra note 32, at 74 ("Even when a clear distinction can be drawn between
withdrawing and withholding, insofar as the distinction is merely an instance of the
acting-omitting distinction it lacks moral significance.").
48. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, 497 U.S. 261, 270 (1990).
49. See, e.g., Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 490 (Ct. App. 1983)
("Even though these life support devices are, to a degree, 'self-propelled,' each pulsa-
tion of the respirator or each drop of fluid introduced into the patient's body by intra-
venous feeding devices is comparable to a manually administered injection or item of
medication. Hence 'disconnecting' of the mechanical devices is comparable to with-
holding the manually administered injection or medication."); Conroy, 486 A.2d at
1233-34 ("[W]e reject the distinction that some have made between actively hastening
death by terminating treatment and passively allowing a person to die of a disease as
one of limited use in a legal analysis of such a decision-making situation .... For a
similar reason, we also reject any distinction between withholding and withdrawing
life-sustaining treatment."). See also PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, DECIDING TO FOREGO
LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra note 32, at 73-77.
1997]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXIV
satisfactorily explained.5 ° Thus, it seems that not all acts are cre-
ated equal. When the issue is the legitimacy of forgoing treatment,
acts (withdrawing treatment) and omissions (withholding treat-
ment) are equivalent. But when an act involves the introduction of
some lethal substance into the patient's body, that act is tradition-
ally deemed culpable.5"
B. Intent
1. The Traditional Explanation
Some courts have distinguished actively from passively hastening
death on the basis of their having a different intent, and they have
justified nonliability for the latter on the absence of the kind of
intent necessary to constitute a crime. According to conventional
reasoning, in cases of genuine suicide, the individual's intent is to
bring about his death. By contrast, forgoing life-sustaining treat-
ment does not constitute suicide because the patient's wish is not to
end life. Indeed, the patient is said to have no specific intent to
die.52
50. Even the Supreme Court, in Vacco, did not engage in any serious analysis. It
was content to rest its conclusion that there is a difference between the two forms of
hastening death on the fact that the "distinction [is] widely recognized and endorsed
in the medical profession and in our legal traditions. . . ." Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct.
2293, 2298 (1997). The Court also noted that "[t]he American Medical Association
emphasizes the 'fundamental difference between refusing life-sustaining treatment
and demanding a life-ending treatment.' American Medical Association, Council on
Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Physician-Assisted Suicide, 10 IssuEs IN LAW &
MEDICINE 91, 93 (1994)."' Id. at 2298 n.6.
51. See Part III, supra, for a discussion of the distinction between causing death
and allowing death to occur naturally.
52. See, e.g., McConnell v. Beverly Enter.-Conn., Inc., 553 A.2d 596, 608 (Conn.
1989) ("Suicide requires a specific intent to die which courts have found absent in
persons who have refused extraordinary methods of medical care."). The source of
this reasoning is the dictum in Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz,
370 N.E.2d 417, 427 n.11 (Mass. 1977), that "refusing medical treatment ... does not
necessarily constitute suicide since ... in refusing treatment the patient may not have
the specific intent to die .... This has even been said to be the case when the patient
was not terminally ill and when treatment could return her to status quo ante. See
Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 75 N.Y.2d 218, 228 n.2, 551 N.E.2d 77, 82 n.2, 551 N.Y.S.2d 876,
881 n.2 (1990).
In Vacco, the Supreme Court subscribed to a variant on this explanation:
[A] physician who withdraws, or honors a patient's refusal to begin, life-
sustaining medical treatment purposefully intends, or may so intend, only to
respect his patient's wishes and "to cease doing useless and futile or degrad-
ing things to the patient when [the patient] no longer stands to benefit from
them.... Similarly, a patient who commits suicide with a doctor's aid neces-
sarily has the specific intent to end his or her own life, while a patient who
refuses or discontinues treatment might not.
Vacco, 117 S. Ct. at 2298-99.
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Rather, in forgoing life-sustaining treatment, the patient's intent
is said to be the relief of suffering. 53 Under this explanation, be-
cause death from forgoing life-sustaining treatment is not suicide,
the physician has not aided suicide and is not subject to criminal
liability. 4 By contrast, actively hastening death is said to be quite
different because the intent is unabashedly to cause the patient's
death.
2. Difficulties with the Traditional Explanation: The Nature of
Criminal Intent
On closer analysis, the intent-based explanations of why there is
no liability for a patient's death from forgoing treatment and the
purported distinction between passively and actively hastening
death are unsupportable.55 The courts in right-to-die cases have
been content to substitute platitudes about intent for analysis.
They have utterly failed to examine the conventional meanings of
intent in criminal law. Had they done so, they might have con-
cluded that when death is passively hastened, it is hard to avoid the
conclusion that criminal intent exists.56
For there to be criminal liability, there must be proof of a requi-
site mental element, traditionally referred to as mens rea, malice,
or scienter 7 This requirement in modern American criminal law,
as exemplified by the Model Penal Code, has been replaced by the
concept of culpability. Under the Model Penal Code, the general
requirement of culpability is established by proof that the actor ac-
ted "purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as the law
may require, with respect to each material element of the of-
53. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1224 & passim (N.J. 1985) ("[P]eople
who refuse life-sustaining medical treatment may not harbor a specific intent to die
• . .rather, they may fervently wish to live, but to do so free of unwanted medical
technology, surgery, or drugs, and without protracted suffering .. "). But see Cruzan
v. Director, 497 U.S. 261, 295 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Suicide was not excused
[at common law] even when committed 'to avoid those ills which [persons] had not
the fortitude to endure,"') (quoting 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *189.).
54. A similar argument can be made for nonliability for homicide when the pa-
tient lacks decision-making capacity and the decision to forgo life-sustaining treat-
ment is made by a legally authorized surrogate.
55. See Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 823 ("[G]iven current medical practices
and current medical ethics, it is not possible to distinguish prohibited from permissible
medical conduct on the basis of whether the medication provided by the doctor will
cause the patient's death.").
56. See id. at 822 ("[T]here can be no doubt that in [disconnecting a respirator, or
authorizing its disconnection,] the doctor intends that, as the result of his action, the
patient will die an earlier death than he otherwise would.").
57. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 commentary at 230.
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fense. '' 58 To convict a person of murder, there must be proof that
the actor acted "purposely or knowingly."5 9
The courts have taken the position that when life-sustaining
medical treatment is forgone, the physician's purpose was to re-
lieve suffering. Therefore, in passively hastening death there is no
liability for assisted suicide, homicide, or related crimes because
the actor's purpose was not to cause death. This explanation, how-
ever, suffers from two defects. First, it overlooks the fact that cul-
pability (or mens rea) may be established in other ways. Second, it
confuses intent with motive.
a. Establishing Culpability
Culpability need not be proved exclusively by demonstrating
that the actor's purpose was to cause death. An alternative is to
prove that the actor acted "knowingly."60 That is, one may be
criminally liable, even absent a purpose to cause death, if one knew
that one's conduct would cause death.61
The assertion that the intent was to relieve suffering is certainly
credible in end-of-life decisions. That it is credible, however, does
not negate the existence of another intent - the intent to cause
death. No reason exists in law or in fact why an actor cannot pos-
sess and be driven to action simultaneously by two intents, espe-
58. Id. § 2.02(1).
59. Id. § 210.2(1)(a).
60. This requirement is akin to "constructive intent" in tort law.
61. "A person acts knowingly.., when ... he is aware that it is practically certain
that his conduct will cause such a result." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(b)(ii). See also
LAFAVE & Scotrr, supra note 34, § 3.5(f), at 225. But see Compassion in Dying, 79
F.3d at 858 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) ("Knowledge of an undesired consequence does
not imply that the actor intends that consequence. A physician who administers pain
medication with the purpose of relieving pain, doing his best to avert death, is no
murderer, despite his knowledge that as the necessary dosage rises, it will produce the
undesired consequence of death.").
Some courts and legislatures approach this matter somewhat differently, but with
the same general result. They say that one is taken to intend the natural and probable
consequences of one's actions. See generally 1 Charles E. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal
Law § 26, at 148 (15th ed. 1993). Thus, even if it is not one's purpose to cause death
and one does not know that one's actions will cause death, criminal liability should be
imposed if the death was the natural and probable consequence of one's conduct.
This is similar to, if not the same as, saying that the standard for establishing what the
actor knew is an objective, rather than a subjective, one. That is, one cannot escape
liability by claiming one did not know that one's action would cause death. By hold-
ing one responsible for intending the natural and probable consequences of one's
actions, we are really saying that the actor should have known that death would re-
sult. Either way, it is impossible to maintain that when a physician withholds or with-
draws life-sustaining medical treatment, the intent was not to bring about the patient's
death.
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cially when those intents are complementary. The existence of a
nonblameworthy intent (the intent to relieve suffering) certainly
does not eliminate the possibility of the actor's simultaneously pos-
sessing a blameworthy intent (the intent to cause death), nor in law
does the existence of the former somehow cancel the effect of the
latter.
b. Avoiding Culpability by the Use of Double Effect
One possible way to avoid this trap is to claim that the actor's
intent was to relieve suffering but acknowledge that this intent can
only be accomplished by causing death; that is, death is the unin-
tended consequence of another, intended consequence.62 This is
the reasoning used to explain and validate the so-called doctrine of
double effect 6 3 in end-of-life decision-making. This doctrine is em-
ployed to legitimate the decades',64 if not centuries', old practice of
using medication for the relief of pain and anxiety in terminally ill
patients, even if the patient dies from the medication. Such medi-
cations, given in adequate doses to be effective, 65 are capable of
killing the patient because of their depressing effect on respira-
tion.66 Thus, a physician who gives a patient an analgesic or seda-
62. See, e.g., Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 162-63 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978)
(competent patient suffering from amyotrophic lateral sclerosis who requested that
his ventilator support be withdrawn "really wants to live, but do so, God and Mother
Nature willing, under his own power. This basic wish to live, plus the fact that he did
not self-induce his horrible affliction, precludes his further refusal of treatment being
classed as attempted suicide.").
63. The doctrine of double effect holds that it is morally acceptable to cause an
otherwise unacceptable result if that result is the unintended consequence of a legiti-
mate act. The classic example of the application of the principle of double effect in
the right-to-die context is the administration by a physician of a pain-killing medica-
tion to a terminally ill patient suffering from intractable pain, which, though not in-
tended to be lethal, in fact turns out to be lethal. In such a case, the physician's intent
is said to be the relief of the patient's suffering, which is a morally and legally accepta-
ble practice (as long as the drug is legal). See generally William E. May, Double Ef-
fect, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 316-19 (Warren T. Reich ed., rev. ed. 1995);
DAVID F. KELLY, THE EMERGENCE OF ROMAN CATHOLIC MEDICAL ETHICS IN
NORTH AMERICA: AN HISTORICAL - METHODOLOGICAL - BIBLIOGRAPHICAL STUDY
(1979).
64. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 823 (9th Cir. 1996) ("As
part of the tradition of administering comfort care, doctors have been supplying the
causal agent of patients' deaths for decades."), rev'd sub nom. Washington v. Gluck-
sberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
65. The adequacy of the dosage is especially important for patients who may have
developed a tolerance to ordinary dosages of the medication and no longer obtain
relief at such levels.
66. See, e.g., David R. Sussman, Sometimes There's Only One Way to End a Pa-
tient's Pain, AM. MED. NEWS, Jan. 11, 1993, at 29 (describing author's treatment of
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tive adequate to relieve the patient's symptoms might actively
hasten the patient's death. By applying the doctrine of double ef-
fect, however, as long as the physician's primary purpose in pre-
scribing the medication is to manage the patient's pain or suffering,
the unintended result of the patient's death should not expose the
physician to criminal liability.67
Although the doctrine of double effect is well accepted by medi-
cal ethicists and physicians to justify giving a patient possibly lethal
doses of medication to relieve serious pain and/or anxiety,68 this
mode of justification has received scant attention from the courts. 69
Perhaps this is because the logic of this doctrine70 skirts the edges
terminally ill cancer patient with morphine for unremitting pain, with the patient
eventually succumbing to the morphine).
67. See generally PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING
TREATMENT, supra note 32, at 77-82. But see Foster v. Tourtellotte, 704 F.2d 1109
(9th Cir. 1983) (hospital refused to honor competent patient's request to disconnect
the respirator and administer requested medication because sedation might hasten
patient's death, possibly making the hospital liable for aiding suicide). In Vacco, the
Supreme Court expressed agreement with this argument: "[W]hen a doctor provides
aggressive palliative care .... painkilling drugs may hasten a patient's death, but the
physician's purpose and intent is, or may be, only to ease his patient's pain. A doctor
who assists a suicide, however, 'must, necessarily and indubitably, intend primarily
that the patient be made dead."' Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 2298 (1997) (citation
omitted).
68. See Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 823 ("Physicians routinely and openly
provide medication to terminally ill patients with the knowledge that it will have a
'double effect' - reduce the patient's pain and hasten his death. Such medical treat-
ment is accepted by the medical profession as meeting its highest ethical standards."),
citing Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs, American Med. Ass'n, Decisions Near the
End of Life, 267 JAMA 2229, 2231 (1992) ("'[T]he administration of a drug necessary
to ease the pain of a patient who is terminally ill and suffering excruciating pain may
be appropriate medical treatment even though the effect of the drug may shorten
life."'). See also COUNCIL ON ETHICAL & JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AMERICAN MED.
Ass'N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS § 2.20, at 37 (1994) ("Physicians have an obligation
to relieve pain and suffering ... of dying patients in their care. This includes provid-
ing effective palliative treatment even though it may foreseeably hasten death.");
69. See, e.g., Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 823; DeGrella v. Elston, 858 S.W.2d
698, 715 (Ky. 1993) (Wintersheimer, J. dissenting); Brophy v. New Eng. Sinai Hosp.,
Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 640 (Mass. 1986) (Nolan, J. dissenting); Hobbins v. Attorney
Gen., 518 N.W.2d 487, 495 n.1 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (Shelton, J. concurring & dis-
senting); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 658 (N.J. 1976). The few courts that have ap-
proved of double effect have done so in the context of termination of life support. See
infra note 73.
70. A study reports that in a sample of 44 patients from whom life support was
withheld or withdrawn, 75 percent were given sedation and analgesia. The reasons for
giving the medications were to relieve pain, anxiety, and air hunger from the termina-
tion of ventilatory support, to comfort families who witnessed the dying, and to hasten
death. William C. Wilson, et al., Ordering and Administration of Sedatives and
Analgesics During the Withholding and Withdrawal of Life Support from Critically Ill
Patients, 267 JAMA 949 (1992). However, "[i]n no instance was hastening death cited
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of accepted principles of intent and causation in criminal (and tort)
law. If courts were seriously to challenge the doctrine of double
effect, the result might be quite the opposite of promoting the hu-
mane practice of medicine.
c. Confusion of Motive and Intent
Another difficulty with the argument that forgoing life-sus-
taining treatment does not implicate criminal liability because the
actor's intent is not blameworthy is that it confuses intent with mo-
tive. 71 "'Intent' is the word commonly used to describe the pur-
pose to bring about stated physical consequences; the more remote
objective which inspires the act and the intent is called 'motive.' 72
If a patient's suffering or own evaluation of his quality of life is
such that he wishes to end his life, then it is correct to say that his
motive, i.e., what motivates him to end his life or to authorize an-
other to do so, is to relieve suffering. His legally relevant intent,
however, is to die because that is the consequence he seeks to
achieve. A physician may also be motivated to end a patient's suf-
fering, and the patient's surrogate may authorize the physician to
forgo life-sustaining treatment motivated by the same concern, but
the intent, as far as the law is concerned, is still to bring about the
patient's death. Thus, although we might not wish to call a death
resulting from forgoing life-sustaining treatment a suicide or homi-
as the only reason for ordering drugs... " id. at 951, doubtlessly because if it were,
the chances of criminal prosecution would be significantly increased.
71. See, e.g., Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 162-63 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978)
("The testimony of Mr. Perlmutter ... is that he really wants to live, but do so, God
and Mother Nature willing, under his own power. This basic wish to live, plus the fact
that he did not self-induce his horrible affliction, precludes his further refusal of treat-
ment being classed as attempted suicide."). In Vacco, the Supreme Court also over-
looked, or succumbed to, the confusion of intent with motive. The Court quoted
approvingly an example given in a dissenting opinion in the Compassion in Dying
case of the use of intent or purpose to distinguish between two acts that may have the
same result. In that case, Judge Kleinfelt wrote that "'When General Eisenhower
ordered American soldiers onto the beaches of Normandy, he knew that he was send-
ing many American soldiers to certain death .... His purpose, though, was to ...
liberate Europe from the Nazis."' Vacco, 117 S. Ct. at 2299 (quoting Compassion in
Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 858 (9th Cir. 1996) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting)). Nice
rhetoric though it may be, the difficulty is that conventional legal analysis would say
that the liberation of Europe was the general's motive. However, because he knew
with substantial certainty that soldiers would die, there was legal intent that they die.
He was not guilty of homicide, however, because the action was taken in the legiti-
mate prosecution of military affairs.
72. KEETON ET AL., supra note 36, § 8, at 35. See also LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra
note 34, § 3.6 (a), at 228 ("One who intentionally kills another human being is guilty
of murder, though ... his motive is the worthy one of terminating the victim's suffer-
ings even from an incurable and painful disease.").
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cide, it is hard to see how this result can be achieved simply by
saying that the intent to bring about death is absent.
d. Equivalent Intent in Actively and Passively Hastening Death
A final problem with the effort to distinguish passively and ac-
tively hastening death on the basis of differential intent is that
whatever one can say about intent in the former is true about the
latter as well. If we assume that all of the above arguments about
intent are incorrect (i.e., when treatment is forgone, there is no in-
tent in law to cause death but rather the legally relevant intent is to
relieve suffering, which is insufficient to support criminal liability)
then precisely the same can be said of intent in actively hastening
death. If we believe that forgoing life-sustaining treatment in-
volves only an intent to relieve suffering and not to cause death,
then when a patient takes an overdose of medication (either pro-
vided by a physician or obtained by some other means), the patient
is merely intending to relieve suffering. Death is the incidental by-
product of this effort, as it is in forgoing treatment. Thus, the pa-
tient's death is not a suicide and the physician who provides the
patient with the means of "relieving suffering," or who administers
a lethal medication to the patient at the patient's request to relieve
suffering, is not assisting suicide nor committing homicide.
Phrasing the analysis in this way helps illustrate the hollowness
of this argument. In both actively and passively hastening death,
the clear intent - or at least the intent with which law traditionally
is concerned - is to bring about death. The motive for doing so in
both cases may be the relief of suffering, but motive is not neces-
sary to establish liability.73
73. See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2310 n.15 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judg-
ment) ("The purpose of terminal sedation is to ease the suffering of the patient and
comply with her wishes .... This same intent ... may exist when a doctor complies
with a patient's request for lethal medication to hasten her death .... If a doctor
prescribes lethal drugs to be self-administered by the patient, it is not at all clear that
the physician's intent is that the patient "be made dead"....).
Motive is not necessarily irrelevant in a criminal prosecution, and evidence of it
may be admissible under certain circumstances. See generally 1 TORCIA, supra note
61, § 89, at 610-13. However, for present purposes what is important is that "the law
is settled that motive is irrelevant to a determination of whether a killing amounts to
murder .... Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 487 (Ct. App. 1983). See
generally ROLLIN MORRIS PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW § 9, at 928
(3d ed. 1982); LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 34, § 3.6(a), at 227-28.
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C. Causation
1. The Traditional Explanation
The third stratagem used by courts to avoid characterizing the
passive hastening of death as unlawful killing is to claim that when
life-sustaining medical treatment is withheld or withdrawn, death
results from natural causes, not from the behavior of those caring
for the patient. Death results from the fact that the patient's un-
derlying illness or injury, for which treatment was being provided
or was proposed, prevents the patient from breathing (when venti-
latory support is forgone), taking nourishment (when tube-feeding
is forgone), ridding the body of wastes (when renal dialysis is for-
gone), or fighting infections (when antibiotics are forgone).7 ' By
saying that the patient dies a natural death or that nature is taking
its course, Mother Nature, who is beyond prosecution, is made the
causal agent of death rather than the health care professionals who
withhold or withdraw treatment.75
Essentially what the courts have done in right-to-die cases is re-
vive the long-discredited "cause/condition" distinction. Although
they have not used this terminology, the courts are concluding that
forgoing life-sustaining treatment is not the cause of death, but
74. See, e.g., Rosebush v. Oakland County Prosecutor, 491 N.W.2d 633, 641 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1992) ("[Dliscontinuance of life-support measures merely allows the pa-
tient's injury or illness to take its natural and inevitable course."). See also Kevorkian
v. Thompson, 947 F. Supp 1152, 1172 (E.D. Mich. 1997), quoting People v. Kevorkian,
527 N.W.2d 714, 728 (Mich. 1994) ("[W]hereas suicide involves an affirmative act to
end a life, the refusal or cessation of life-sustaining medical treatment simply permits
life to run its course, unencumbered by contrived intervention. Put another way, sui-
cide frustrates the natural course by introducing an outside agent to accelerate death,
whereas the refusal or withdrawal of life-sustaining medical treatment allows nature
to proceed, i.e., death occurs because of the underlying condition."). In Vacco, the
Supreme Court adopted this formulation: "[W]hen a patient refuses life-sustaining
medical treatment, he dies from an underlying fatal disease or pathology .... " Vacco,
117 S. Ct. at 2298.
75. See, e.g., Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d at 162-63 ("As to suicide, the facts here
unarguably reveal that Mr. Perlmutter would die, but for the respirator. The discon-
necting of it, far from causing his unnatural death by means of a "death producing
agent" in fact will merely result in his death, if at all, from natural causes [citation
omitted].... Mr. Perlmutter ... really wants to live, but do so, God and Mother
Nature willing, under his own power. This basic wish to live, plus the fact that he did
not self-induce his horrible affliction, precludes his further refusal of treatment being
classed as attempted suicide."); see also PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, DECIDING TO FOREGO
LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra note 32, at 38. This stratagem overlaps with
both the "omission" and "intent" stratagem. When there is an omission to treat, it is
said that a patient, who is dependent for his existence on medical treatment, is not
"killed" but inevitably dies a "natural death" and similarly that the intent is not to
bring about death but to relieve suffering.
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merely a necessary condition for death to occur. As such, it is not
blameworthy under the traditional rules of criminal liability. In so
concluding, however, they are conveniently overlooking well-es-
tablished rules of criminal liability routinely applied in other
contexts.76
By contrast, it is said that when a physician engages in conduct
that actively hastens death, it is the physician's conduct which is the
cause of death.77 Certainly causation is clearer in instances of ac-
tively hastening death than in passively hastening death, but this
does not end the inquiry. It merely means that there must be a
deeper probing into the latter, which courts have been steadfastly
disinclined to do.
2. Difficulties with the Traditional Explanation
Further inquiry demonstrates that causation-based efforts to find
a difference between passively and actively hastening death do not
wash.78
76. See generally LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 34, § 3.3(d), at 209-10. As Prosser
explains, "Many courts have sought to distinguish between the active 'cause' of the
harm and the existing 'conditions' upon which that cause operated. If the defendant
has created only a passive, static condition which made the damage possible, the de-
fendant is said not to be liable." KEETON, ET AL., supra note 36, § 42, at 277. In
applying this reasoning to end-of-life decision-making, one would say that the doctor
merely creates a "passive, static condition" when life-sustaining medical treatment is
stopped allowing the true causal agent, the patient's condition, to operate. Prosser
adds, "'[c]ause' and 'condition' still find occasional mention in the decisions; but the
distinction is now almost entirely discredited." Id. at 278.
77. See, e.g., Vacco, 117 S. Ct. at 2298 ("[I]f a patient ingests lethal medication
prescribed by a physician, he is killed by that medication.").
78. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 822-23 (9th Cir. 1996)
(citations omitted):
[D]rawing a distinction on the basis of whether the patient's death results
from an underlying disease no longer has any legitimacy. While the distinc-
tion may once have seemed tenable, at least from a metaphysical standpoint,
it was not based on a valid or practical legal foundation and was therefore
quickly abandoned. When Nancy Cruzan's feeding and hydration tube was
removed, she did not die of an underlying disease. Rather, she was allowed
to starve to death. In fact, Ms. Cruzan was not even terminally ill at the
time, but had a life expectancy of 30 years. Similarly, when a doctor pro-
vides a conscious patient with medication to ease his discomfort while he
starves himself to death-a practice that is not only legal but has been urged
as an alternative to assisted suicide the patient does not die of any underly-
ing ailment. To the contrary, the doctor is helping the patient end his life by
providing medication that makes it possible for the patient to achieve suicide
by starvation.
Id.
See also Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 729 (2d Cir. 1996):
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a. Sine Qua Non Test
If a sine qua non test of causation, the primary one accepted by
the Model Penal Code,79 is employed to escape liability, we must
be able to say "but for" the act or omission of a human, the patient
would not have died. When life-sustaining treatment is withheld or
withdrawn, however, this is clearly not the case. If treatment had
been initiated or continued, the patient would not have died - at
least not then and there - and it is a well-established principle that
the shortening of a life, even the life of one who is close to death, is
criminally culpable.8"
b. Natural and Probable Consequences Test
Another test of causation used in the criminal law is the "natural
and probable consequences" test. Under this test, an actor's con-
duct is said to be the legally responsible cause of a result if the
result is the natural and probable consequence of the actor's con-
duct.81 For example, if a patient is being maintained by some form
of life support, it is because there is reasonable medical certainty
that the patient will die without treatment. Therefore, if treatment
is withdrawn, death is the natural and probable consequence of the
withdrawal. There would be no difficulty making a prima facie
showing that this test of causation is met.
Indeed, there is nothing "natural" about causing death by means other than
the original illness or its complications. The withdrawal of nutrition brings
on death by starvation, the withdrawal of hydration brings on death by dehy-
dration, and the withdrawal of ventilation brings about respiratory failure.
By ordering the discontinuance of these artificial life-sustaining processes or
refusing to accept them in the first place, a patient hastens his death by
means that are not natural in any sense. It certainly cannot be said that the
death that immediately ensues is the natural result of the progression of the
disease or condition from which the patient suffers.
Id.
79. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03(1)(a) ("Conduct is the cause of a result when ...
it is an antecedent but for which the result in question would not have occurred").
80. See, e.g., Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (Ct. App. 1983) (holding
where doctor intentionally caused a patient's death, homicide is not excusable simply
because the patient would have died soon anyway). See also Washington v. Gluck-
sberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2265 (1997) ("[T]he prohibitions against assisting suicide never
contained exceptions for those who were near death."). It is less clear that the patient
would have lived when the issue is one of withholding treatment rather than with-
drawing treatment. However, almost all, if not all, of the right-to-die cases involve the
withdrawing of treatment. Furthermore, in the cases, actual or posited, in which with-
holding treatment is at issue, there is a belief on the part of the health care profession-
als that the treatment will keep the patient alive or else they would not be proposing
to employ it.
81. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 73, at 812-13.
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In situations in which life-sustaining medical treatment is with-
held rather than withdrawn, it may be more difficult to establish
that not initiating treatment caused the patient's death. If the
treatment in question is truly "life-sustaining" treatment, ex hy-
pothesi, the failure to administer it is the cause of the patient's
death. These are, however, questions of fact. What is important
for present purposes is that causation could be established in some
situations of withholding treatment. Thus, one cannot make the
blanket statement that withholding treatment could never be the
legal cause of death.
c. Other Tests: Foreseeability and Substantial Factor
Some jurisdictions employ a test of causation in criminal law, or
in some areas of criminal law, based on foreseeability. This test is
not significantly different from the natural and probable conse-
quences test,82 and the analysis for present purposes is similar.
Again, if a patient is being kept alive by a life-sustaining medical
treatment and the entire course, or an essential ingredient, of the
treatment is discontinued, it is reasonably foreseeable that the pa-
tient will die. Thus, if such treatment is terminated, this test of
causation will be met, or at least a prima facie case will be easy to
make out.
The same is true of another important test of causation used
when there is more than one factual cause of the result in question,
the substantial factor test. It is used more to rule out a factor as
being causal than to pinpoint it as a legal cause.83 Under this test, a
person who terminates life support could be excluded as the legal
cause of a patient's death if termination were not a substantial fac-
tor in bringing about death. In all instances of withdrawing life-
sustaining treatment, however, the patient would not have died, at
least not then and there, had treatment been continued. Thus, the
person withdrawing treatment cannot be excluded as a legal cause
of death.
The concept of legal causation is ultimately a mix of factual and
policy considerations of who should be responsible for what, and
under what circumstances. Nonetheless, to deny that there is legal
causation in passively hastening death, and yet to find it in actively
hastening death, requires more than a mere assertion that causa-
82. Id.
83. Id. at 799-80.
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tion in the two types of hastening death is different. Factually it is
different. The question is whether this fact ought to make a differ-
ence with respect to the ultimate issue of culpability. If it does, one
must be able to point to important, relevant differences between
passively and actively hastening death. Perhaps some exist 84 but
they cannot be found in the realm of legal causation, as they are
not in the nature of the act or intent.
D. Legal Right
If it is the case, as argued above, that all of the elements of homi-
cide or assisted suicide are met when life-sustaining treatment is
withheld or withdrawn, how could it be that criminal liability still
does not ensue? The answer that has generally been given by
Quinlan and its progeny85 is that one or more of these elements
really does not exist.
Some courts, however, have added a more forthright reason:
there is no criminal liability for passively hastening death because
"the decision and its implementation are authorized under the
common law."' 86 These courts have in effect, although not always
in these terms, concluded that it does not matter whether passively
hastening death is suicide when accomplished by the patient, as-
sisted suicide when aided by another, or homicide when, at the re-
quest of the patient or surrogate, treatment is withheld or
withdrawn by a physician. Rather, these courts maintain that there
is no liability for passively hastening death because there is a legal
right to have life-sustaining medical treatment withheld or
withdrawn.
Of course there is no liability for doing something one has a right
to do. But this truism begs the question, "Does one have a legal
right to do it?" which is another way of saying, "Is it criminal?" On
closer examination, what these courts seem to be saying is that
although one might be able to make out a prima facie case of each
of the elements of assisted suicide or criminal homicide when life-
sustaining medical treatment is withheld or withdrawn, the conduct
in question cannot constitute the basis for the imposition of crimi-
84. See infra Part V.
85. See supra note 30 and the accompanying text.
86. Rosebush v. Oakland County Prosecutor, 491 N.W.2d 633, 641 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1992). See also In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 670 (N.J. 1976); Eichner v. Dillon,
52 N.Y.2d 363, 377, 420 N.E.2d 64, 71, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 273 (1981); In re Colyer, 660
P.2d 738, 751 (Wash. 1983).
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nal liability because there is a defense based on law to such
charges.8 7
The "law" on which the defense is based is the right to refuse
medical treatment, which arises from common law, constitutions,
or both.88 This right is derivative of a broader common-law or con-
stitutional "right to be let alone." In the context of medical deci-
sion-making, this right to be free from state interference is often
referred to as self-determination or autonomy. 9 This is the coun-
terpart of a criminal law defense of justification such as necessity or
a tort law defense of privilege. More generally, it is a kind of con-
87. Some courts have taken an analogous approach to permit doctors to adminis-
ter adequate medication for relief of pain and anxiety that might accompany the ter-
mination of life support in a conscious patient even if it might kill the patient, in effect
legitimating the doctrine of double effect. See State v. McAfee, 385 S.E.2d 651, 652
(Ga. 1989) (patient's "right to be free from pain ... is inseparable from his right to
refuse medical treatment"); McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 631 (Nev. 1990) ("In
all cases decided by a district court in favor of the patient, the court's order shall
specify that any physician or health care provider who assists the patient in receiving
the benefits of his or her decision with minimal pain, shall not be subject to civil or
criminal liability."). State legislatures have also begun to enact statutes explicitly au-
thorizing the use of adequate medication for the relief of pain and in some cases
defining death resulting from the administration of such medication as not being the
assistance of suicide. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.215(3)(a) ("medications or pro-
cedures to relieve another person's pain or discomfort, even if the medication or pro-
cedure may hasten or increase the risk of death," is not abetting or aiding suicide
"unless the medications or procedures are knowingly administered, prescribed, or dis-
pensed to cause death"). See generally 1 MEISEL, supra note 18, § 8.7, at 79 (Table 8-
1) (collecting statutes).
88. The source of the right is sometimes also statutory, the most likely statutes
being advance directive statutes. However, advance directive statutes were enacted
not to create substantive rights but merely to provide a mechanism for individuals to
implement their wishes about life-sustaining medical treatment once they lack the
capacity to do so contemporaneously. Courts have consistently upheld the principle
that advance directive statutes are not intended to preempt common-law or state con-
stitutional rights to make advance directives and to have them enforced because these
rights exist independent of the statutes. See, e.g., Camp v. White, 510 So. 2d 166 (Ala.
1987); Bouvia v. Superior Court (Glenchur), 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 302 (Ct. App. 1986);
Bartling v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (Ct. App. 1984); Barber v. Superior
Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (Ct. App. 1983); McConnell v. Beverly Enter.-Conn., Inc.,
553 A.2d 596, 605 & n.15 (Conn. 1989); Browning v. Herbert, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990);
Corbett v. D'Alessandro, 487 So. 2d 368, 370 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); DeGrella v.
Elston, 858 S.W.2d 698, 706-07 (Ky. 1993); In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947, 952 (Me.
1987); In re Myers, 610 N.E.2d 663, 668 (Prob. Ct. Summit County, Ohio 1993); In re
Grant, 747 P.2d 445 (Wash. 1987), modified, 757 P.2d 534 (Wash. 1988); L.W. v. L.E.
Phillips Career Dev. Ctr., 482 N.W.2d 60, 68 ("[T]he stated legislative policy is to
leave the decision, if not declared by the patient, to be determined as a matter of
common law .... ). See generally Gregory Gelfand, Living Will Statutes: The First
Decade, 1987 Wis. L. Rev. 737, 796-97; 2 MEISEL, supra note 26, §§ 10.10-10.16.
89. See, e.g., Thor v. Superior Court, 855 P.2d 375, 380 (Cal. 1993) ("[T]he long-
standing importance in our Anglo-American legal tradition of personal autonomy and
the right of self-determination.").
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fession-and-avoidance defense in which the defendant in effect ad-
mits that there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the elements
of the offense yet seeks to avoid conviction by claiming that he had
a right to engage in the conduct under the circumstances in
question.
The same is true when a patient dies after life-sustaining medical
treatment has been withheld or withdrawn. Assuming that the ele-
ments of assisted suicide or criminal homicide could be proved be-
yond a reasonable doubt, liability should still not be imposed
because the patient (or someone acting on his behalf) had the right
under the circumstances to authorize the physician to take the ac-
tions that caused the patient's death.
III. Consent as Legitimating Passively Hastening Death
The courts that have concluded that forgoing life-sustaining
treatment is not a crime because of the patient's legal right to re-
fuse treatment are on the right track. However, the reasoning un-
derlying the "legal right" rationale has never been fully developed
largely because the conventional wisdom about why passively has-
tening death is not a crime-lack of an act, lack of intent, and lack
of causation-has never been seriously challenged.
After the Supreme Court's holding that the Constitution does
not bar states from enacting statutes prohibiting assisted suicide,9"
litigation will arise in state courts seeking to assert the invalidity of
these statutes on state constitutional and/or common law grounds.
State courts will then be compelled to reexamine their reasoning
about the noncriminality of forgoing life-sustaining medical treat-
ment and the purported distinction between passively and actively
hastening death. When they do so, they will find that their reason-
ing about the required act, intent, and causation comes up short.
These courts will then be forced to develop more fully their claim
that there is no criminal liability for passively hastening death by
withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment because pa-
tient's have a right to refuse treatment.91
What is it, at core, that does legitimate passively hastening
death? One might assert that it is the patient's legal right to refuse
medical treatment, but there is a deeper explanation. The right to
refuse medical treatment is itself based on the more fundamental
90. See supra note 5.
91. See generally Cruzan v. Director Mo. Dept. Of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990)
(holding that a competent person has a constitutionally protected right to refuse un-
wanted medical treatment).
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legal value of self-determination, which in turn is implemented
through the mechanism of consent to treatment - or more pre-
cisely, informed consent.92
Consider the following example. A doctor who strongly believes
that the earth's precious natural resources are being squandered is
obsessed with saving electricity. At first she is content to berate
her family to turn out the lights when they leave a room and substi-
tute fluorescent for incandescent bulbs, but she eventually discon-
nects the electricity from her house. She then begins to introduce
conservation measures at the hospital, but as at home, they have
piddling results. After investigating, she discovers that a major
source of electrical consumption is ventilator-dependent patients
and she begins to make plans to turn off all ventilators. One eve-
ning, when she is the sole physician on duty in the hospital, she
implements her plan. She achieves her goal of saving electricity,
and the patients die.
If one accepts the current reasoning of the courts at face value,
that is, if the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment is not a crime
because it is an omission and not an act, because it does not cause
the patient's death, because there is no intent to cause death, or
because of some combination, then our environmentally-conscious
physician has committed no crime: she has "omitted" to provide
ventilation by withdrawing it; death has been "caused" by the pa-
tient's illness or injury that results in an inability to breath without
a ventilator; her intent was to improve the environment, not to
bring about death; death was merely the unintended consequence
of legal conduct.
This is obviously not the correct conclusion. The physician's
conduct is criminal beyond doubt. This example illustrates that
claims can be made that on their face are the same as those
presented by courts to justify the actions of physicians when venti-
latory support has been withdrawn from patients but which do not
deserve protection.
What distinguishes the environmentally-conscious doctor from
the physicians whose proposed conduct the courts have evaluated
since Quinlan?93 One thing is motive. In conventional right-to-die
cases, the physician's motive is to end suffering; whereas the envi-
ronmentally-conscious doctor is motivated to save the environ-
ment. This motive is perhaps on an equal moral plane with the
relief of suffering of the terminally ill, but not at all relevant to the
92. See id.
93. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
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morality of end-of-life decision-making. That, however, cannot be
the determinative difference because the actor's motive is not an
element in establishing criminal liability.
The answer is simple: consent. In the consensus right-to-die
cases, the physician's conduct is licit because it is authorized by a
patient who gives consent to that which he has the right to author-
ize. When patients lack decision-making capacity, the forgoing of
life-sustaining treatment can still be licit because it is authorized by
one who has the legal authority to speak for the patient. This is
what courts mean when they say that forgoing life-sustaining treat-
ment is not culpable because there is a "legal right" to refuse medi-
cal treatment.
The argument that a patient's consent legitimates passively has-
tening death comes up against the objection that consent is not a
defense to a crime. 94 That well-accepted dictum, however, is just
that: dictum. It is not a fundamental principle of law.
Opponents assert that consent is not a defense because in crimi-
nal prosecutions, unlike civil prosecutions, the interests being as-
serted are those of the state rather than the victim of the crime.95
Thus, the consent of the victim does not absolve the actor of crimi-
nal liability, for the victim does not have the authority to absolve
the actor. Only the state is able to do that. The state can absolve
an actor of criminal liability in a variety of ways including decisions -
not to prosecute and the creation of criminal defenses such as in-
sanity and entrapment, which recognize that a crime has been com-
94. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2265 (1997)(stating that the
consent of a homicide victim is "wholly immaterial to the guilt of the person who
cause[d] [his death]"); 3 J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND
16 (1883); 1 F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW 451-52 (9th ed. 1885); Martin v. Common-
wealth, 37 S.E.2d 43, 47 (Va. 1946) ("'The right to life and to personal security is not
only sacred in the estimation of the common law, but it is inalienable'); LAFAVE &
ScoTT, supra note 34, § 5.11, at 477; 1 TORCIA, supra note 61, at 304-05 ("Where
conduct constitutes a crime because it causes or threatens bodily harm, the law as a
matter of public policy will allow a victim's consent to be effective only if the conduct,
to which the consent refers, does not cause or threaten serious bodily harm or
death."), citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.11(2)(a). See also MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.11 commentary.
95. Although the victim has been wronged, the victim must file a civil action in
tort to personally right the wrong that resulted from the actor's conduct. The victim is
free to bring a civil action before or after the criminal prosecution based on the same
underlying conduct, or instead of a criminal prosecution, if the state chooses not to
prosecute. This distinction between criminal and civil actions is not a necessary fea-
ture of law. Other legal systems permit the use of criminal sanctions for public as well
as private purposes but the bifurcated system is a long-standing and well-accepted
feature of the American legal system.
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mitted, but provide absolution to further more important state
interests.
Is this not the same situation in instances of passively hastening
death? Although a prima facie case of assisted suicide or homicide
can be made out when life-sustaining medical treatment is withheld
or withdrawn, the courts have concluded that such conduct should
not be prosecuted because of a superior societal interest in respect-
ing the autonomy of the individual, which includes the individual's
interest in determining for himself whether to permit or deny inva-
sions of bodily and psychic integrity.96
Prosecution for terminating life-sustaining treatment has oc-
curred in only one case, Barber v. Superior Court,97 in which the
physicians were absolved from liability for murder for essentially
this reason. The Barber court concluded that there was legally suf-
ficient intent or knowledge on the part of the defendant-physicians
that the patient would die as a result of their actions and that their
actions were the legal cause of the patient's death.98 The court also
concluded that although the physicians' conduct (the withholding
of treatment) was an omission rather than an act, an omission
could support criminal liability. 99 The three essential elements of
homicide were satisfied. Nonetheless, the court held there was no
criminal liability because the physicians' omission was not culpa-
ble.10 There was no duty to act and, more specifically, no duty to
continue to provide artificial nutrition and hydration. Of central
importance is the fact that the court held that there was no duty to
act because the doctors had been relieved of this duty by the con-
sent of those having legal authority to do so - the patient's
family. 01
Thus, consent functions as a defense in right-to-die cases, just as
other justifications are recognized as defenses under appropriate
circumstances. Consent, however, is not merely a defense. To
speak of it as such degrades its status in all medical decision-mak-
ing. Consent is the fundamental validating property of forgoing
96. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2265-66.
97. 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 490
100. Id.
101. Id. at 489, 492 ("A long line of cases, approved by the [California] Supreme
Court ... have held that where a doctor performs treatment in the absence of an
informed consent, there is an actionable battery. The obvious corollary to this princi-
ple is that a competent adult patient has the legal right to refuse medical treat-
ment .... [P]etitioners consulted with and relied on the decisions of the immediate
family, which included the patient's wife and several of his children.").
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life-sustaining treatment whether by withholding or withdrawing,
whether by a competent patient or a surrogate.
IV. Consent as Legitimating Actively Hastening Death
I have argued that actively and passively hastening death are on
an equal footing before the law and that each ought to be treated
as prima facie criminal because in each the elements of act, intent,
and causation are met. Yet we do not treat passively hastening
death as criminal when there is legally valid consent. I now want to
turn to consider whether actively hastening death should be treated
similarly.
Passively hastening death is criminally nonculpable, when it is,
not simply because the patient (or authorized surrogate) gives con-
sent, but because consent is given to that over which the patient
has legal dominion. The substantive right implemented by giving
(or withholding) consent is the right to be let alone, which includes
the right to be free from unwanted invasions of one's bodily and
psychic integrity.1"2
Opponents of legalization claim this is the fundamental distinc-
tion between passively and actively hastening death. 0 3 As the ter-
minology itself implies, to fail to respect a patient's wish to have
death passively hastened constitutes an invasion of the patient's
bodily and psychic integrity; to treat the patient would be to not let
102. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
103. In Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2270 (1997), the Supreme Court
viewed the right at stake in passively hastening death as the right to be free from
battery, which it found to be a long-recognized legal right. Adopting the reasoning in
Cruzan v. Director, 497 U.S. 261 (1990), the Glucksberg Court explained that the
assumed right to be free of unwanted medical procedures for supplying artificial nu-
trition and hydration "was not simply deduced from abstract concepts of personal
autonomy." Id. Rather, "[g]iven the common-law rule that forced medication was a
battery, and the long legal tradition protecting the decision to refuse unwanted medi-
cal treatment, our assumption was entirely consistent with this Nation's history and
constitutional traditions." Id. But see id. at 2306 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judg-
ments) ("[T]he source of Nancy Cruzan's right to refuse treatment was not just a
common-law rule. Rather, this right is an aspect of a far broader and more basic
concept of freedom that is even older than the common law. This freedom embraces,
not merely a person's right to refuse a particular kind of unwanted treatment, but also
her interest in dignity, and in determining the character of the memories that will
survive long after her death.");.id. at 2311 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgments)
("[I] would use words roughly like a 'right to die with dignity.' But irrespective of the
exact words used, at its core would lie personal control over the manner of death,
professional medical assistance, and the avoidance of unnecessary and severe physical
suffering-combined."). That this may be the case for federal constitutional purposes
does not preclude state courts from deciding otherwise on state law grounds. Id.
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the patient alone. Actively hastening death, the argument contin-
ues, does not implicate the right to be let alone. In fact, actively
hastening death, by its very nature, requires that there be some
invasion of the patient's bodily and psychic integrity. Thus, the in-
dividual interests in passively and actively hastening death are not
only different, they are polar opposites.
Sometimes this argument is put in terms of the difference be-
tween a negative and a positive right. A negative right is said to be
involved in passively hastening death: a right to be free from un-
wanted, and thus unwarranted, interference with one's bodily in-
tegrity. By contrast, in actively hastening death, a positive right is
said to be at stake; the patient is claiming entitlement against an-
other to have something done for him. Positive rights are, how-
ever, strongly disfavored by the common law' °4 and by the
Constitution,'0 5 and can ordinarily be conferred only by statute.
Thus, if actively hastening death is to be legalized, it must be
achieved by statutory enactment.
This argument fundamentally misunderstands what is at stake in
the debate about actively and passively hastening death. First, to
put it somewhat concretely, dying, or as Judge Reinhardt repeat-
edly penned in Compassion in Dying, "determining the time and
manner of one's own death,"106 is at stake in both situations. Sec-
ond, this objection to actively hastening death, and the correlative
attempt to distinguish it from passively hastening death, views the
underlying right in the passive cases too narrowly. What is in-
volved is not merely a right to be free from unwanted bodily and
psychic invasions, but "a right to determine what shall be done with
[one's] body," as Cardozo put it generations ago."' 7 The familiar
locutions, such as the right to refuse treatment, are used simply
because of the medical context in which the broader right has tradi-
tionally been made manifest.
Finally, the nature of the right involved in actively hastening
death is not a positive right; it is just as surely a negative right as
104. KEETON ET AL, supra note 36, §§ 53, 56. Cf. Barber v. Superior Court, 195
Cal. Rptr. 484, 490 (Ct. App. 1983) (failure to feed infant distinguishable from doc-
tor's termination of artificial nutrition and hydration because parent has "a clear duty
to feed an otherwise healthy child"). See generally 2 MEISEL, supra note 26, § 19.11.
105. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189
(1989); Harris v. McCrae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rod-
riguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). See generally 2 MEISEL, supra note 26, § 19.10.
106. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 793 & passim (9th Cir. 1996)
(en banc).
107. Schloendorff v. Soc'y of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 1.29, 105 N.E. 92, 93
(1914) (emphasis added).
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that implicated in the passive cases. The fundamental issue in the
legalization of actively hastening death, as it is in the legalization of
passively hastening death, is the preclusion of state-imposed penal-
ization of the conduct in question. In the Quinlan case, 08 for ex-
ample, Karen Quinlan's parents wanted a decree that the
physicians who were being asked to terminate life-sustaining treat-
ment would not be subject to criminal prosecution if they complied
with the request. In effect, they sought a declaration that the
power of the state, as manifested, through the criminal process,
would not be interposed against the physician.
This is exactly what the petitioners attempting to legalize physi-
cian-assisted suicide are seeking. Proponents of physician-assisted
suicide have not sought, nor should they be accorded, the right to
compel physicians (or anyone else) to actively hasten death, even
with a patient's consent. That would be a claim for a disfavored
positive right.
An analogy to abortion helps to clarify this point. The litigation
to establish the right to an abortion sought not merely an abstract
right to terminate a pregnancy, but a right to terminate a preg-
nancy free from state imposition of penalties on the pregnant wo-
man and the physician who performs the abortion. This would be
an empty right if what had been sought and granted was merely the
right of a woman to have an abortion without being subjected to
criminal prosecution for so doing, but not the right of a woman to
have a physician perform the operation without being subject to
prosecution. Indeed, such a limited right would completely under-
cut the harm sought to be prevented - namely, the right not to
have to subject oneself to dangerous self-performed measures to
terminate a pregnancy.
The same is true about actively hastening death. Although some
patients can actively hasten their own deaths, others (and perhaps
many) cannot. The right to actively hasten death, if there is to be
one, is hardly a robust one if terminally ill people are denied the
right to enlist the assistance of a physician. The analogy to abortion
is again useful. 10 9 A woman can perform an abortion on herself,
and she might even be successful both in performing the procedure
108. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
109. See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2288 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment)
("Without physician assistance in abortion, the woman's right would have too often
amounted to nothing more than a right to self-mutilation, and without a physician to
assist in the suicide of the dying, the patient's right will often be confined to crude
methods of causing death, most shocking and painful to the decedent's survivors.").
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and in avoiding serious harm. Likewise, a terminally ill person can
attempt to end his own life through a variety of means, but there
are two kinds of risks in doing so. The first is that the effort will
not succeed. 110 The second, more serious, risk is that the person
may incur a range of physical and psychological harms in the pro-
cess of not succeeding. Moreover, there are also many terminally
ill people who lack the physical ability to arrange their own deaths.
If they have a right to determine the time and manner of their
death, this right can only be exercised with the assistance of some
other person. Denying the right to assistance is to deny the under-
lying right.
That actively hastening death, like abortion, is a negative right,
can also be discerned from some of the limitations which have been
imposed on abortion to prevent its being transformed into a posi-
tive right. There are two fundamental limitations: there is no right
to have the cost of an abortion paid for by the state; and a physi-
cian cannot be compelled to perform an abortion. Legalization has
meant only that a physician may perform an abortion, not that he
must.
In other words, there is a right to decide to have an abortion and
to enlist the assistance of a willing physician, not a right to abor-
tion, just as there should be a right to decide to actively hasten
one's death with the assistance of a willing physician. The state
might choose to pay for a physician to actively hasten death, just as
some states have chosen to pay for abortions, but states would not
be compelled to do so. These are limitations which could, and per-
haps should, also be imposed on actively hastening death.
Similarly, legalization of actively hastening death would mean
that physicians would be free from criminal liability, not that they
would be compelled to perform this service. Throughout all of the
discussions, it must not be forgotten that the fundamental interest
at stake in both actively and passively hastening death is the right
to decide the time and manner of one's death, and to procure the
110. It might not succeed for a number of reasons. First, patients might not have
knowledge of the means of ending their lives. Second, they may not have access to the
means of doing so, especially to medications available only by prescription, which is
why a robust right to actively hasten death must include the right not merely to the
assistance of another person but of a physician (and a pharmacist). Third, people may
the have requisite knowledge and means, but not the physical ability to obtain access
to the means to end their own lives. Finally, people may not have the physical ability
to end their own lives, which takes us beyond assisted suicide to active euthanasia.
See Cruzan v. Director, 497 US, 261 (1990).
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assistance necessary to transform that right into reality, free from
state interference.11'
V. Protecting Against the "Abuse" of Actively Hastening
Death
Even if there is no bright line between actively and passively has-
tening death - both are manifestations of the fundamental right of
self-determination and both are legitimated by consent-there are
still arguments which can be lodged against the prima facie claim
for the validity of actively hastening death. These claims must be
examined to determine whether the prima facie case can be over-
come. This is what the Second1 12 and Ninth Circuits"13 did, albeit
within a constitutional framework, and found them to be unpersua-
sive support for statutes criminalizing physician-assisted suicide.
1 4
In defending against claims of unconstitutionality, opponents of
physician-assisted suicide have cited a number of reasons why the
state has an important interest in maintaining the criminality of this
conduct. A list of these reasons could be compiled from many
sources, in a number of ways. I will rely on the reasons set forth by
the majority opinion in Compassion in Dying,'1 5 the purpose here
being illustrative, not comprehensive:
1. Disadvantaged individuals, the poor, the elderly, the disabled,
and minorities, will be pressured to submit to physician-as-
sisted suicide, becoming victims rather than beneficiaries." 6
2. The real problem is the "lack of universal access to medical
care" resulting from misplaced national priorities." 7 If high
111. See generally James E. Fleming, Constitutional Tragedy in Dying. Responses to
Some Common Arguments Against the Constitutional Right to Die, 24 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 881 (1997).
112. See Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
113. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd sub
nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
114. In Glucksberg, the Supreme Court also evaluated these claims but found them
to be persuasive. But see Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2271-2275 (Stevens, J., concurring
in the judgment) (characterizing the difference in causation in actively and passively
hastening death as "illusory" and observing that "the actual cause of death [in termi-
nal sedation] is the administration of heavy doses of lethal sedatives. This same ...
causation may exist when a doctor complies with a patient's request for lethal medica-
tion to hasten her death.").
115. 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc). I had originally thought that there were
many other objections to physician-assisted suicide, but a review of the legal and med-
ical literature leads me to conclude that those discussed in Compassion in Dying are a
fair summary of those that have been made by others.
116. Id. at 825; see also Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2273.
117. See Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 826.
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quality medical and other care were provided to the dying,
they would not seek physician-assisted suicide.
3. Acceptance of physician-assisted suicide would make doctors
insensitive "to the plight of terminally ill patients, and.., they
will treat requests to die in a routine and impersonal manner,
rather than affording the careful, thorough, individualized at-
tention that each request deserves."" 8
4. Acceptance of physician-assisted suicide would have a sub-
stantial adverse effect on the patient's "children, other family
members, and loved ones. ' 19
5. Acceptance of physician-assisted suicide would undermine
"the integrity of the medical profession 1 2 0 and require doc-
tors to act "contrary to their individual principles. '12 1
6. Acceptance of physician-assisted suicide will lead us down the
slippery slope, converting a right to die into an obligation to
die in which "courts will sanction putting people to death, not
because they are desperately ill and want to die, but because
they are deemed to pose an unjustifiable burden on
society." 22
The purpose here is not to attempt to refute these arguments.
There is no denying the truth to these claims and they must be
taken seriously. There is, however, no evidence, nor is there any
abstract reason, why these arguments should be considered more
compelling in the context of actively hastening death than they are
in the context of passively hastening death.12 3 Any argument that
can be made against actively hastening death can be levelled with
equal vigor against passively hastening death. There is no signifi-
cant difference between the two that would warrant acceptance in
the latter and rejection in the former. 124
It will come as no surprise that patients (whether belonging to
some categorically vulnerable group, or merely vulnerable because
118. Id. at 826-27.
119. Id. at 827.
120. Id. at 827; Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2273.
121. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 830.
122. Id.; see also Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2274 n.23 (noting "the case for a slippery
slope has been made out").
123. See Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 730 (2d Cir. 1996) ("There is no clear indica-
tion that there has been any problem in regard to the former, and there should be
none as to the latter.").
124. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 2960 (Scalia, J. concurring) (noting "the irrelevance of
the action-inaction distinction").
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they are patients) are susceptible to pressure by physicians.125 Phy-
sicians can subtly or heavy-handedly pressure patients into forgo-
ing life-sustaining treatment by telling them that it is useless,
painful, and expensive. Moreover, the lack of access to health care
may cause patients -to reluctantly request or accede to a suggestion
that they forgo life-sustaining treatment because they cannot afford
the treatment they need and want.2 6 Physicians can also become
hardened to the plight of the terminally ill by the knowledge that
forgoing life-sustaining treatment is an easy out for the physician.
Family members suffer either way. They experience severe loss
when a terminally ill patient dies from forgoing treatment, but they
also suffer if the patient is forced to continue suffering by not being
allowed to forgo treatment if that is his wish. Forgoing life-sus-
taining treatment was once at odds with the ethics of the medical
profession. One of the important factors in its acceptance by the
medical community has been its legalization. Finally, predictions
that terminally ill patients should be prohibited from forgoing life-
sustaining treatment because it would be subject to widespread
abuse have similarly proved to be untrue.
Why has the experiment in passively hastening death, begun by
Quinlan, turned out as well as it has? The key to the answer is
consent. Consent is not only the validating principle underlying
passively or actively hastening death, it is also the mechanism
which protects against abuse in both situations. Just as procedural
and substantive protections have been developed to assure that
abuse does not occur when forgoing life-sustaining treatment oc-
curs, similar protection must be created for actively hastening
death.
Work has already begun in this direction. The Oregon Death
with Dignity Act, 2 7 adopted by statewide initiative in 1994, con-
tains a set of such protections. Although they might not be totally
125. See Quill, 79 F.3d at 730 ("'[P]sychological pressure' can be applied just as
much upon the elderly and infirm to consent to withdrawal of life-sustaining equip-
ment as to take drugs to hasten death.").
126. See Glucksberg, 112 S. Ct. at 2273.
127. Oregon Death with Dignity Act, OR. REv. STAT. § 13 (1996), implementation
stayed, Lee v. State, 891 F. Supp. 1439 (D. Or. 1995), rev'd, 107 F.3d 1382 (9th
Cir.),cert. denied sub nom. Lee v. Harcleroad, 118 S. Ct. 328 (1997). See Charles H.
Baron, et al., Statute: A Model State Act to Authorize and Regulate Physician-Assisted
Suicide, 33 HARV. J. LEG. 1 (1996). See also Timothy E. Quill, et al., Care of the
Hopelessly Ill: Proposed Clinical Criteria for Physician-Assisted Suicide, 327 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1380 (1992).
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adequate,2 8 the protections adopted in the early cases legitimating
the passive hastening of death are not the ones exclusively relied
on today. This concern did not prevent the legalization of forgoing
life-sustaining treatment which presents essentially the same poten-
tial risks as actively hastening death. Therefore, such a concern
should not be allowed to impede the development of the law con-
cerning actively hastening death.
Conclusion
I have attempted to show several things. First, the arguments
that courts have put forth for two decades to justify the criminal
nonculpability of passively hastening death are fundamentally un-
sound. Nonetheless, passively hastening death should not invoke
criminal sanctions against those whose conduct causes it if there is
legally adequate consent to the conduct and its consequences. Sec-
ond, once we see that the stock arguments used to justify passively
hastening death are spurious and that the true justification for its
legitimacy is self-determination implemented through consent, the
purported legal distinctions between actively and passively hasten-
ing death fade. Finally, although there are sound, indeed strong,
arguments against the legitimation of actively hastening death,
these same arguments can be made with equal force against pas-
sively hastening death. Yet, they are not made, or when made they
have been rejected. In light of the virtual indistinguishability of the
two practices, there are no sound legal reasons for continuing the
prohibition against actively hastening death. What is critical is not
the means by which death occurs but that there be adequate pro-
tections against abuse, whatever the means of hastening death.
If states decide to decriminalize assisted suicide, the job of assur-
ing adequate safeguards remains, just at it has in the context of
passively hastening death. It has taken at least a decade for the
states to arrive at a consensus about the procedural and substantive
contours of the right to have death passively hastened. We should
expect that it will take at least as long in the case of actively hasten-
ing death. Indeed it might take longer, not because of any inherent
differences between the two but because of greater public con-
cerns, whether warranted or not, about the latter. To assure public
confidence, both in passively and actively hastening death, the fo-
128. See, e.g., Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Elisabeth Daniels, Oregon's Physician-Assisted
Suicide Law: Provisions and Problems, 156 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 825 (1996).
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cus of our efforts must be on safeguards, rather than on the means
by which death occurs.
Doctors have been permitted, to put it bluntly, to kill terminally
ill patients for at least two decades. Despite the use of sanitizing
phrases like "forgoing life-sustaining treatment," we need to recog-
nize that this is what has been happening. Once it is understood
why this has been allowed and why it has been perfectly legitimate,
it is simple to see that only two choices remain: re-criminalize for-
going life-sustaining treatment or de-criminalize physician-assisted
suicide. While it may have been useful, or even necessary, for
courts to employ a variety of fictions to establish the right to pas-
sively hasten death, they no longer serve any useful purpose in that
realm. These fictions must now be discarded so that their perpetu-
ation does not undermine the very ends they were originally de-
vised to promote and protect: the humane care of the dying.
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